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SCHOOLHOUSE ROCKED: HOSTY V. CARTER AND
THE CASE AGAINST HAZELWOOD
Virginia J. Nimick*
I do not believe that it can be too often repeated that the
freedoms of speech, press, petition and assembly
guaranteed by the First Amendment must be accorded to
the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to
the ideas we cherish.1
INTRODUCTION
The federal courts have long held that public schools serve as
“the cradle of our democracy,”2 and have recognized the special
status of public schools resulting from the particular educational
mission with which they are entrusted.3 Unlike any other
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2007; B.A., Davidson College, 2004. The
author would like to thank her family for their overwhelming love and support.
The author would also like to thank the Journal of Law and Policy staff,
especially Jason Putter for his humor and patience. The author wishes to thank
Margaret Hosty, the titular plaintiff, for her enthusiasm and guidance. And
finally, the author would like to thank her friends, especially John Miras, John
Mattoon, Christopher Prior, and David Kaye, who have made it all worthwhile.
1
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 137
(1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
2
James v. Bd. of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1972).
3
Brown v. Bd of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the
performance of our most basic responsibilities, even service in the
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is
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governmental body, our public schools are charged with two
potentially incompatible tasks: encouraging independent thought
and cultivating the “marketplace of ideas”4 while, at the same time,
instilling the values necessary to create productive members of
society.5 With this in mind, public colleges and universities across
the country have, for the most part, broadly embraced the First
Amendment.6 There are times, however, when the free expression
rights embodied in the First Amendment clash with administrative
attempts to limit student speech. One such conflict arose in the fall
of 2000 at Governors State University when school administrators
required student journalists to obtain official approval before
publishing the school’s student-run paper.7
In the resulting lawsuit, Hosty v. Carter, student journalists
alleged that such prior review and restraint violated their First
Amendment rights of free speech and expression.8 Ultimately, the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the interests of
the college trumped the rights of the students,9 resulting in alarm
the principle incident in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to
adjust normally to his environment.
Id.
4

This “marketplace of ideas” concept can be traced in federal
jurisprudence to Justice Holmes’ dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he ultimate good desired
is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth
is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.”).
5
Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
864-65 (1982). For a more detailed discussion of this potential conflict, see, e.g.,
William G. Buss, School Newspapers, Public Forum and The First Amendment,
74 IOWA L. REV. 505, 505 (1989).
6
The First Amendment provides, “Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people to
peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7
Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 732 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. denied,
164 L. Ed. 2d 47 (2006).
8
Id.
9
Id.
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and outrage among free speech advocates across the country.10
Prior to the decision in Hosty, the standard derived from the
seminal First Amendment case of Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier11 had been applied only to student speech in primary
and secondary schools. Hosty represents the first extension of the
restrictive Hazelwood framework to post-secondary student
speech, and stands in direct conflict with decisions from both the
First and Sixth Circuits. 12
According to the Hazelwood standard, school officials may
regulate “school-sponsored expressive activities” (such as a
student newspaper) as long as their actions are “reasonably related
to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”13 Not only does Hazelwood’s
application in Hosty place the Seventh Circuit in direct conflict
with its sister Circuits, it represents a break from the deeply
entrenched tradition of recognizing college and university
campuses as a marketplace of ideas.
Though it did not endorse the idea, the Supreme Court did not
foreclose the possibility of extending the Hazelwood framework to
college campuses. Instead, in what has become an increasingly
problematic footnote, the Court declined to address Hazelwood’s
relevance outside of primary and secondary education.14 Given the
10

See, e.g., Student Press Law Center, News Flash: Free Speech Groups
Worry Hosty Ruling Will Scale Back Students’ First Amendment Rights,
available at http://www.splc.org/newsflash.asp?id=1042 (quoting Greg
Lukianoff, director of public and legal advocacy for the Foundation for
Individual Rights in Education (FIRE), explaining, “[a]s much as people like to
think they value free speech, as soon as there’s a loophole that people can take
advantage of to silence their critics or opinions they think are wrong, they will
jump on them. This opinion creates tremendous opportunities for administrators
and other students who want to infantilize students or deny them their basic
rights.”).
11
484 U.S. 260 (1988).
12
Student Gov’t Ass’n v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d
473, 480 n.6 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that Hazelwood “is not applicable to
college newspapers.”); Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 2001) (en
banc) (finding that Hazelwood “has little application to this case.”).
13
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
14
Id. at 273 n.7 (“We need not now decide whether the same degree of
deference is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at
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impact an extension of the reasoning in Hosty could have on First
Amendment free speech rights, Hazelwood framework should not,
as a matter of law and policy, be applied to higher education.
Parts I.A and B of this Note discuss the development of free
speech rights of students in primary and secondary public
schools.15 Part I.C focuses on the development of student speech in
post-secondary public institutions. Part II concerns the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in Hosty, representing the first unequivocal
application of Hazelwood to the student press outside of the high
school setting. Part III questions the applicability of an extension
of Hazelwood to post-secondary education. In addition, Part III
sets forth several arguments, grounded in both law and policy,
questioning the ruling in Hosty and discussing the practical effect
of the decision on future student speech.
I. FREE SPEECH RIGHTS OF STUDENTS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
The Supreme Court has had occasion to address the rights of
students in public institutions on numerous occasions.16 Parts A
and B of this section address students’ First Amendment rights in
public primary and secondary schools, while Part C explores the
rights of students enrolled in undergraduate or graduate
institutions.
A. Student Speech in Primary and Secondary Schools
The free speech rights of students in primary and secondary
schools have been shaped by three cases: Tinker v. Des Moines
the college and university level.”).
15
For purposes of this discussion, “post-secondary” is used to refer to those
students who have graduated from high school, and includes those students
enrolled at both undergraduate and graduate institutions.
16
The First Amendment applies with particular force to public institutions,
as they are acting as an arm of the state. Accordingly, this Note deals only with
students enrolled in the public education system. A discussion of the free speech
rights of students in private institutions is beyond the scope of this Note. For an
excellent starting point for such a discussion, see, e.g., Nancy J. Meyer,
Assuring Freedom for the College Student Press After Hazelwood, 24 VAL. U.
L. REV. 53 (1989).
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Independent School District,17 Bethel School District v. Fraser,18
and Hazelwood. Tinker’s now infamous declaration, “[i]t can
hardly be said that students or teachers shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate,”19 stands as a strong affirmation of students’ rights. However,
in the years since Tinker, the Supreme Court has severely
circumscribed those rights with its decisions in Fraser and
Hazelwood.20
1. Tinker v. Des Moines: Material and Substantial Disruption
Tinker involved three young teenagers: John Tinker,
Christopher Eckhardt, and John’s younger sister, Mary Beth
Tinker. In December 1965, a group of adults and students met at
the Eckhardt home and resolved to publicize their objections to the
Vietnam War by wearing black armbands during the holiday
season.21 The students did so despite a school district-wide ban.22
For this expression, Eckhardt and Mary Beth Tinker were
suspended; John Tinker was sent home without a formal
suspension.23 Through their parents, the students sued the school
district alleging that their First Amendment rights of free speech
and expression had been violated.24
In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court sided with the students.25
Justice Fortas, writing for the majority, began by noting that school

17

393 U.S. 503 (1969).
478 U.S. 675 (1986).
19
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
20
See discussion infra Parts I.A.2-3.
21
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
22
Id. (The principals of the Des Moines schools became aware of this plan
and adopted a policy stating that any student wearing an armband to school
would be asked to remove it and, if he refused, would be suspended until he
agreed to return without it).
23
JOHN W. JOHNSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR STUDENT RIGHTS: TINKER V.
DES MOINES AND THE 1960S 18, 20, 25 (1997).
24
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
25
Id. at 513-14.
18

NIMICK MACROED CORRECTED 07-30-6.DOC

946

7/30/2006 12:36 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

boards, as agents of the State, were not above the Bill of Rights.26
Quoting Justice Jackson, he wrote: “[t]hat [Boards of Education]
are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous
protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are
not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to
discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes.”27 The Court reasoned that in order for school officials
to justify a prohibition against a particular type of expression, they
must demonstrate that their actions were fueled by something more
than the “desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”28 Thus, restriction of
expressive activity is appropriate only when it can be shown that
the conduct in question would “materially and substantially
interfere” with the operation of the school.29
Applying that standard to the facts of Tinker, the Court
concluded that the armbands had not “materially and substantially
interfer[ed]” with the school’s educational mission.30 Only a few of
the nearly 20,000 students in the school system wore the armbands
and only five were suspended for it.31 Noting the importance of
respecting constitutionally protected rights in the nation’s public
schools, Justice Fortas concluded “state-operated schools may not
26

Id. at 508.
Id. (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
637 (1943)).
28
Id. at 509.
29
Id. The dissent reached the opposite conclusion:
The original idea of schools, which I do not believe is yet
abandoned as worthless or not of date, was that children had not
yet reached the point of experience and wisdom which enabled
them to teach all of their elders. It may be that the Nation has
outworn the old-fashioned slogan that ‘children are to been seen
not heard,’ but one may, I hope, be permitted to harbor the thought
that taxpayers send children to school on the premise that at their
age they need to learn, not teach.
Id. at 522 (Black, J. dissenting).
30
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513-14.
31
Id. at 514. See also JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 166 (discussing court
notes in which the clerk observed in the record a total lack of violent incidents
related to the armbands).
27
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be enclaves of totalitarianism. School officials do not possess
absolute authority over their students. Students in school as well as
out of school are ‘persons’ under the Constitution.”32
Though Tinker involved student speech apart from journalism,
less than three months later, its reasoning was expanded to prohibit
censorship of the student press.33 A federal court in New York
applied Tinker to a high school newspaper, holding that “[i]t is
patently unfair in light of the free speech doctrine to close to the
students the forum which they deem effective to present their
ideas. The rationale of Tinker carries beyond the facts in that
case.”34
2. Bethel School District v. Fraser: The Beginning of the Retreat
The lower courts spent the next twenty years fleshing out the
“material and substantial disruption” test.35 In 1985, the Supreme
32

Id. at 511. Justice Fortas continued:
In our system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit
recipients of only that which the States chooses to communicate.
They may not be confined to the expression of those sentiments
what are officially approved. In the absence of a specific showing
of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students
are entitled to freedom of expression of their views.

Id.
33

Interestingly, Tinker grew out of an instance of censorship of a student
newspaper. Three days before the students wore their armbands and before the
school district banned them, a school administrator censored an article in
Eckhardt’s school newspaper. Another student, Ross Peterson, had submitted the
article to the paper explaining the purpose of the planned protest and calling for
support of a truce. After prohibiting publication of the article, school
administrators “hastily” met and banned armbands from the schools. See,
JOHNSON, supra note 23 at 5-6; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
34
Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (emphasis
added) (internal citations omitted).
35
The lower federal courts followed Tinker in some instances, while in
others, they strayed. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their
First Amendment Rights at the Schoolhouse Gates: What’s Left of Tinker?, 48
DRAKE L. REV. 527 (2000). As Professor Chemerinsky explains, “There are
literally dozens of lower federal court cases over the last thirty years dealing
with student speech. They follow no consistent pattern; some are quite speech-
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Court’s decision in New Jersey v. T.L.O., limited the Fourth
Amendment rights of minors in public schools and signaled a shift
toward conservatism in the Court.36 Just one year later, in Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser,37 the Supreme Court broadened
its changing philosophy to encompass students’ First Amendment
rights as well. The dispute began when Matthew Fraser delivered a
sexually suggestive speech in support of a student government
candidate at a school assembly.38 After delivering the speech,
Fraser faced suspension for violating a school policy prohibiting
the use of profane language.39 He ultimately served a two-day
suspension and filed suit claiming a violation of his First
Amendment free speech rights.40
In a 7-2 decision, the Court upheld the suspension and
recognized the first exception to Tinker, holding that schools may
determine what constitutes appropriate speech in classrooms and
school assemblies.41 Chief Justice Burger, though acknowledging
Tinker’s proclamation that “students do not ‘shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate,’”42 declared that “the constitutional rights of
students in public school are not automatically coextensive with
the rights of adults in other settings.”43 While noting the
importance of permitting the expression of a variety of

protective and follow Tinker’s philosophy as well as its holding, while others are
very restrictive of student speech and treat Tinker as if it has been overruled.” Id.
at 542.
36
469 U.S. 325, 327 (1985) (balancing school officials’ need to search and
students’ Fourth Amendment rights); see also, JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 20607.
37
478 U.S. 675 (1986).
38
Id. at 677-78.
39
The Bethel High School disciplinary rule provided that “[c]onduct which
materially and substantially interferes with the educational process is prohibited,
including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures.” Id. at 678.
40
Id. at 679.
41
Id. at 683.
42
Id. at 680 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
43
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683 (referring to New Jersey v. T.L.O., 460 U.S. 325,
340-42 (1985)).
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viewpoints,44 the Court deferred to the administration’s
determination that Fraser’s speech had seriously undermined the
school’s educational mission.45 Reasoning that the school’s
primary function was to “inculcate the habits and manners of
civility,”46 the Court concluded that the school was not required to
tolerate “lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct such as
that indulged by [Fraser].”47
The Court further highlighted the differences between Tinker
and Fraser. First, unlike the armbands at issue in Tinker, Fraser’s
speech was not political in nature, but was merely “lewd and
indecent.”48 Where children are concerned, the Court held that the
Constitution affords less protection to lewd and obscene
expression.49 Second, because Fraser’s speech was given at a
school assembly, the Court found it perfectly appropriate for the
school to disassociate itself from the speech by punishing it.50
Based on these distinctions, the Court declined to apply
Tinker’s substantial and material interference test, and instead
utilized a balancing test.51 The Court reasoned that Fraser’s First
44

Id. at 682-83.
See id. at 681. “The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and
controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced against the
society’s countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially
appropriate behavior.” Id. at 681.
46
Id. Chief Justice Burger, quoting two historians, described the role and
purpose of the American public school: “[Public] education must prepare pupils
for citizenship in the Republic . . . It must inculcate the habits and manners of
civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to
the practice of self-government in the community and the nation.” Id. (quoting
CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY M. BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 228 (1968)).
47
Id. at 683.
48
Id. at 685. “Unlike the sanctions imposed on the students wearing the
armbands in Tinker, the penalties imposed in this case were unrelated to any
political viewpoint.” Id.
49
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684-85. Chief Justice Burger explicitly stated, “The
speech could well be seriously damaging to its less mature audience, many of
whom were only 14 years old and on the threshold of awareness of human
sexuality.” Id. at 683.
50
Id. at 685.
51
Id. at 681-86.
45
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Amendment interest in his freedom of expression must be weighed
against the school’s interest in “[inculcating] fundamental values
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system.”52
Here, Fraser’s interest in his freedom of expression was
outweighed by the school’s need to preserve order and civility.53
Chief Justice Burger went so far as to quote with approval from
Justice Black’s dissent in Tinker: “‘I wish therefore, . . . to disclaim
any purpose . . . to hold that the Federal Constitution compels the
teachers, parents, and elected school officials to surrender control
of the American public school system to public school students.’”54
3. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier:55 Legitimate
Pedagogical Concern
While Matthew Fraser was giving his speech at Bethel High
School in April 1983,56 the students at the Spectrum, the student
newspaper published in conjunction with the Journalism II class at
Hazelwood East High School in St. Louis, Missouri, were
preparing two pages of articles concerning teen pregnancy,
marriage, juvenile delinquency, and divorce.57 One article
contained quotes from several students, identified by name, about
the impact of their parents’ divorce.58 Other articles concerned
three Hazelwood students (who were not identified by name) who
had become pregnant and discussed, in detail, their sexual activity
and birth control practices.59
52

Id. (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)).
Id. at 685. “[Such] utterances are no essential part of any exposition of
ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality.” Id. (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942)).
54
Id. at 686 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 526) (Black, J., dissenting).
55
484 U.S. 260 (1988).
56
Id. at 677.
57
Id. at 264 n.1.
58
Id. at 263.
59
Id. See also, MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: THE FIRST AMENDMENT 101
(Peter Irons ed. 1997).
53

NIMICK MACROED CORRECTED 07-30-6.DOC

7/30/2006 12:36 PM

FREE SPEECH ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES

951

On May 10th, in accordance with established practice,60 the
proof pages for the May 13th edition were submitted to Principal
Robert E. Reynolds for prior review.61 Mr. Reynolds reviewed the
proof and on May 11th determined that two articles—one
concerning teen pregnancy and the other the impact of divorce on
high school students—were inappropriate for the Spectrum.62 In
order to remove the offending articles and still meet the press
deadline, Reynolds decided to cut two pages from the six page
proof, deleting a total of seven articles.63 Several students brought
suit in United States District Court for the District of Missouri in
January 1984, alleging that their First Amendment rights had been
violated.64 After a bench trial, the district court concluded that the
students’ First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and
expression had not been violated.65 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed in January 198666 and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in January 1987.
In a 5-3 decision,67 the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth
Circuit, ruling in favor of the school district. The Court narrowly
framed the issue as “the extent to which educators may exercise
60

Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 263.
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 263-64. See also, Andrew H. Utterback, Hazelwood School District
v. Kuhlmeier, in FREE SPEECH ON TRIAL: COMMUNICATION PERSPECTIVES ON
LANDMARK SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 250, 251 (Richard A. Parker ed. 2003).
64
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 264. The students alleged that Principal
Reynolds’ actions amounted to an illegal, content-based prior restraint. More
specifically, they claimed that the articles did not violate any pre-existing,
established standard for editing articles from the Spectrum—none of the articles
would have caused material and substantial disruption to the work. See
Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School District, 578 F. Supp. 1286, 1289 (D.C. Mo.
1984).
65
Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450, 1467 (D.C. Mo.
1985).
66
Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1370 (8th Cir.
1986).
67
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262. The unusual 8-Justice vote was due to the
fact that Justice Lewis Powell had just retired and Justice Anthony Kennedy had
not yet been seated.
61
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control over the contents of a high school newspaper produced as
part of a school’s journalism class.”68 Acknowledging Tinker and
Fraser, Justice White noted that although “[s]tudents in public
schools do not ‘shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,’”69 a school is not
required to tolerate speech that is “inconsistent with its ‘basic
educational mission.’”70
Central to the Court’s analysis was the impact of the public
forum doctrine.71 Applying the public forum framework,72 the
68

Id.
Id. at 266 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
70
Id. (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685).
71
Id. at 267 (“We deal first with the question whether Spectrum [the school
newspaper] may appropriately be characterized as a forum for public
expression.”). This type of public forum analysis is frequently used by the
federal courts to determine the scope of First Amendment protections in
situations involving public property. See, e.g., Derek P. Langhauser, Free and
Regulated Speech on Campus: Using Forum Analysis for Assessing Facility
Use, Speech Zones, and Related Expressive Activity, 31 J.C. & U.L. 481 (2005);
Thomas J. Davis, Assessing Constitutional Challenges to University Free
Speech Zones Under Public Forum Doctrine, 79 IND. L.J. 267 (2004); see also,
Laurence H. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §12-24 (2nd ed. 1988).
72
Id. In Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educator’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37,
45-56 (1983), the Court defined the scope of the three categories of public
forums. First, there are “traditional public forums”—places such as streets and
parks that have “immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public.” Id. at
45. In these “quintessential” public forums, the government may only impose
restrictions on expressive activity if the regulation is narrowly tailored to
effectuate a compelling state interest. Id. The government may also impose
reasonable, content-neutral time, place and manner restrictions. Id. A limited
public forum is public property that the State has opened for limited use by the
public for certain expressive activity. Id. The government is not required to open
this forum but, once it has, the same First Amendment standards apply as in a
traditional public forum. Id. at 46. Non-public fora include government property
that has been reserved for a specific purpose, based on the idea that “the State,
no less than a private owner of property, has power to reserve the property under
its control for the use to which it has been lawfully dedicated.” Id. Regulations
here need only to be viewpoint-neutral and rationally related to a government
interest. Id.
Two years later, in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985), the Court, quoting Perry, held that:
69
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Court concluded that the Spectrum, as a “school-sponsored
publication,” was a non-public forum, and as a result, school
officials were entitled to regulate its contents in any “reasonable
manner.”73 First and foremost, the Court looked to school board
policy which provided that “[s]chool sponsored publications are
developed within the adopted curriculum and its educational
implications in regular classroom activities.”74 The Court went on
to highlight other factors evincing government control: (1) the
faculty advisor exercised a great deal of editorial control over the
paper; (2) the Spectrum was published in conjunction with the
Journalism II class for which students received grades and
academic credit; and (3) it was established policy that the paper be
submitted to the school principal for prior review.75 School
administrators had reserved the paper for the specific purpose of
teaching students about journalism under the guidance of an
academic advisor.76 As such, they were constitutionally within
their rights to “exercise editorial control over style and content” so
long as their actions were “reasonably related to a legitimate
pedagogical concern.”77
[t]he government does not create a public forum by inaction or by
permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse. Accordingly, the Court has
looked to the policy and practice of the government to ascertain
whether it intended to designate a place not traditionally open to
assembly and debate as a public forum.
(quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 47) (internal citations omitted).
73
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267-70. Justice White stated that because public
schools do not possess all the attributes of streets, parks and other “traditional
public forums” that “time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.” Id.
at 267 (quoting Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)). Thus, school
facilities are only considered public forums if school officials have “by policy or
practice” opened those facilities “for indiscriminate use by the general public,”
or some segment of the public, such as the student body. Id.
74
Id. at 268 (alterations in original) (citing Hazelwood School Board
Policy).
75
Id. at 268-69.
76
Id. at 268.
77
Id. at 273.
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The Court explicitly distinguished its holding in Tinker, which
related to a “student’s personal expression that happen[ed] to occur
on the school premises.”78 In contrast, the Court in Hazelwood was
concerned with whether the First Amendment required a school
“affirmatively to promote particular student speech.”79 Hazelwood
involved school-sponsored student speech that students, parents,
and members of the community might “reasonably perceive to bear
the imprimatur of the school.”80 To ensure that the “views of the
individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school,” the
Court held that school officials should have greater latitude to
regulate such expressive activities.81
Justice Brennan dissented,82 proclaiming that Principal
Reynolds “used a paper shredder” on the free speech rights of the
students without so much as considering obvious alternatives.83 He
wrote, “[s]uch unthinking contempt for individual rights is
intolerable from any state official. It is particularly insidious from
the one to whom the public entrusts the task of inculcating in its
youth an appreciation for the cherished democratic liberties that
our Constitution guarantees.”84
Brennan also found fault with what he termed the Court’s
78

Id. at 270-71.
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 270-72. The Court went on to say that “A school must be able to
set high standards for the student speech that is disseminated under its
auspices—standards that may be higher than those demanded by some
newspaper publishers or theatrical producers in the “real” world—and may
refuse to disseminate student speech that does not meet those standards.” Id. at
272. As such, “a school in its capacity as a publisher of a school newspaper or
producer of a school play may “disassociate itself,” not only from speech that
would “substantially interfere with [its] work. . .or impinge upon the rights of
other students,” but also from speech that is, for example, ungrammatical,
poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane,
or unsuitable for immature audiences.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
82
For a more in-depth discussion of Justice Brennan’s dissent, see, e.g.,
Scott Andrew Felder, Stop the Presses: Censorship and the High School
Journalist, 29 J.L. & EDUC. 443, 448-51 (2000).
83
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 290 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84
Id.
79
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“taxonomy of school censorship”—concluding that Tinker applies
to one type of speech and not another.85 He took issue with the
majority’s distinction between a “student’s personal expression
that happens to occur on the school premises” (as in Tinker), and
school-subsidized or sponsored expression that the public might
“reasonably believe to bear the imprimatur of the school.”86 He
argued that “[t]he Court does not, for it cannot, purport to discern
from our precedents the distinction it creates.”87 Brennan agreed
that a school should be able to disassociate itself from speech that
is “ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased
or prejudiced,” but that to reach such a conclusion, the Court need
not abandon Tinker, but apply it.88 He argued, “[t]he educator may,
under Tinker, constitutionally ‘censor’ poor grammar, writing, or
research because to reward such expression would ‘materially
disrup[t] the newspaper’s curricular purpose.”89
In a line now famous to student journalists, Justice Brennan
concluded, “[t]he young men and women of Hazelwood East
expected a civics lesson, but not the one the Court teaches them
today.”90
B. Reaction to Hazelwood
Despite Hazelwood’s pronouncement that public schools could
censor speech, the government does not retain absolute power to
censor a nonpublic forum.91 The Court still requires that the
85

Id. at 281.
Id.
87
Id. Justice Brennan went on to explain that nowhere in Tinker did the
Court touch on the personal nature of the speech. Moreover, “personal
expression that happens to occur on school premises” does not accurately
describe Fraser’s speech. He did not just “happen” to give his speech on school
grounds. Quoting Fraser, Justice Brennan concluded “if ever a forum for
student expression was ‘school-sponsored,’ Fraser’s was.” Yet, despite this
apparent contradiction, the Fraser Court faithfully applied Tinker. Id. at 281-82.
88
Id. at 283.
89
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 284 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (alteration in
original).
90
Id. at 291.
91
See e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S.
86

NIMICK MACROED CORRECTED 07-30-6.DOC

956

7/30/2006 12:36 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

censorship be “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns.”92 The rule of Hazelwood appears to be that unless the
school is involved in the funding or promotion of the speech,
expression by students must be tolerated. Nonetheless, legal
scholars wondered whether there might be any limit to the
“legitimate pedagogical concern” standard.93 Many questioned
whether Hazelwood had effectively overruled Tinker.94 One
37, 45-46 (1983).
92
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
93
See, e.g., Walter E. Forehand, Constitutional Law—Tinkering with
Tinker: Academic Freedom in the Public Schools—Hazelwood School District
v. Kuhlmeier, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 159, 182 (1988) (stating that Hazelwood
does “not establish a sufficiently clear standard of evaluation for school board
conduct”); Shari Golub, Tinker to Fraser to Hazelwood—Supreme Court’s
Double Play Combination Defeats High School Students’ Rally for First
Amendment Rights: Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 38 DEPAUL L.
REV. 487, 513 (1989) (critiquing “the vague and broad ‘legitimate pedagogical
concern’ standard”); Reene E. Rothauge, Seen But Not Heard: In What Forum
May High School Students Exercise First Amendment Rights After Hazelwood?,
25 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 197, 218 (1989) (“Students’ First Amendment rights
will be subject to the parochial whims of district school boards.”).
94
See e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, supra note 35 (arguing that despite
Hazelwood and Fraser, there remain First Amendment protections for noncurricular student speech and poses no threat of disruption); Mark Yudof, Tinker
Tailored: Good Faith, Civility, and Student Expression, 69 St. JOHN’S L. REV.
365 (1995) (noting that although Fraser and Hazelwood did not specifically
overrule Tinker, they have greatly altered its holding); Andrew D.M. Miller,
Balancing School Authority and Student Expression, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 623,
645 (2002) (“Certainly, neither Fraser nor Kuhlmeier explicitly overruled
Tinker, and it more than arguable that neither implicitly overruled it); J. Marc
Abrams & S. Mark Goodman, End of an Era? The Decline of Student Press
Rights in the Wake of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 1988 DUKE L.J.
706, 707 (“[Hazelwood] eviscerates the Supreme Court’s decision in Tinker,
overrules many lower-court decisions protective of the student press, and
curtails student press rights established for well over a generation.”); Thomas C.
Fischer, Whatever Happened to Mary Beth Tinker and other Sagas in the
Marketplace of Ideas, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 351, 411 (1993) (arguing
that current jurisprudence is more closely akin to Justice Black’s dissenting view
in Tinker, “[a]ll this without Tinker being reversed, or even cited unfavorably.”);
Clay Wiesenberger, Constitution or Conformity: When the Shirt Hits the Fan in
Public Schools, J.L. & EDUC. 51, 55 (2000) (“It can be argued that Tinker has
been overruled, at least partially.”).
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commentator even went so far as to describe Hazelwood as a
“tsunami that has wiped out all that existed before.”95
Despite the confusion, Hazelwood’s impact was immediate.96
Less than an hour after the Court’s decision was announced on the
radio, a high school principal censored an article on AIDS.97 That
same day, in another high school, the entire staff of a schoolsponsored newspaper resigned, and instead began work on an
underground newspaper.98 In fact, the Student Press Law Center
(SPLC), a non-profit group that provides legal support and advice
to student media outlets, has reported an increase in the number of
inquiries concerning censorship it has received for every year since
Hazelwood. In 1996, SPLC received a record 221 requests for legal
help from high school student journalists or their advisors.99 In
2002, SPLC recorded 529 such requests—an increase of nearly
240%.100 SPLC Executive Director Mark Goodman attributes the
continual increase to the Court’s decision in Hazelwood, noting
that it has “essentially gutted the First Amendment in many of
America’s High Schools.”101
Since Hazelwood was handed down, its rationale has been
expanded to encompass all forms of student expression. High
school teachers and administrators have broadly interpreted
Hazelwood as a grant of authority to “control student expression
for the sake of preserving the institutional and educational integrity
of public schools.”102 Its reasoning has been extended beyond the
95

See, Abrams & Goodman, supra note 94, at 728.
For a general analysis of the impact of Hazelwood, see e.g., Carol S.
Lomicky, Analysis of High School Newspaper Editorials Before and After
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier: A Content Analysis Case Study, 29
J.L. & EDUC. 463 (2000).
97
WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1988, at A27.
98
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1988, at 8.
99
High School Censorship Calls Soar in ‘97, STUDENT PRESS L. CENTER
REP., Fall 1998, at 3.
100
Legal Requests to the SPLC Continue to Grow: Censorship Questions
from College Journalists Show Dramatic Increase, STUDENT PRESS L. CENTER
REP., Fall 2003, at 3.
101
High School Censorship Calls Soar in ‘97, supra note 99, at 3.
102
Bruce O. Hafen & Jonathan O. Hafen, The Hazelwood Progeny:
Autonomy and Student Expression in the 1990s, 69 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 379, 396
96
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realm of the student press and applied to a variety of First
Amendment issues,103 including student attire and appearance,104
school mascots,105 curriculum decisions,106 faculty speech,107
academic freedom,108 and student speech at school assemblies and
graduation ceremonies.109
Moreover, although the Court’s decision in Hazelwood allowed
for censorship of student speech, local officials remain free to
determine the appropriate level of regulation.110 In the years after
(1995). See also Rosemary Salomone, Free Speech and School Governance in
the Wake of Hazelwood, 26 GA. L. REV. 253, 274-306 (1993) (the decisions
typically grant to school officials “broader legal discretion in molding student
thought and opinion and consequently expression into a shape that conforms
with the dominant values of the community.”) Id. at 315; Stanley Ingber,
Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual Rights: The First Amendment
in Institutional Contexts, 69 TEX L. REV. 1, 86 (1990) (arguing that the use of
Hazelwood to restrict certain expression is likely send students “mixed signals
about the intellectual traits that citizens require.”) Id.
103
For a more detailed discussion of case law in the wake of Hazelwood,
see, e.g., Laura K. Shulz, A “Disacknowledgment” of Post-Secondary Student
Free-SpeechBrown v. Li and the Applicability of Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier to
the Post-Secondary Setting, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 1185 (2003); Martha M.
McCarthy, Post-Hazelwood Developments: A Threat to Free Inquiry in Public
Schools, 81 ED. LAW REP. 685 (1993); Floyd G. Delon, “The More Things
Change. . .”: Re-Emerging Student First Amendment Rights Issues, 59 ED. LAW
REP. 963 (1990); Hafen & Hafen, supra note 102; Mark J. Fiore, Trampling the
“Marketplace of Ideas”: The Case Against Extending Hazelwood to College
Campuses, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1915 (2002).
104
See, e.g., Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524 (9th Cir.
1992); Baxter v. Vigo Country Sch. Dist., 26 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 1994); Boroff v.
Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000).
105
See, e.g., Crosby v. Holsinger, 852 F.2d 801 (4th Cir. 1988).
106
See, e.g., Virgil v. Sch. Bd. of Columbia Cty., 862 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir.
1989); Kirkland v. Northside Independent Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794 (5th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 926 (1990).
107
See, e.g., Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1993); Miles v. Denver
Public Sch., 994 F.2d 773 (10th Cir. 1991).
108
See, e.g., Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004 (7th
Cir. 1990).
109
See, e.g., Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1021 (1989); Brody v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1992).
110
See, e.g., SPLC, STATE ANTI-HAZELWOOD LEGISLATION FACES
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Hazelwood, numerous states passed legislation establishing various
degrees of protection.111 Most recently, legislatures in three states
have considered changes to laws governing student speech and
expression.112
Finally, though numerous lower federal courts have
contemplated Hazelwood’s applicability at the university level,113
SUCCESSES, DEFEATS, REPORT, Spring 1999, at 12; SPLC, ANTI-HAZELWOOD
CAMPAIGNS LAUNCHED IN 3 STATES, Spring 2005, at 4, available at
http://splc.org/report_edition.asp?id=36.
111
Iowa’s Student Exercise of Free Expression statute is typical. IOWA
CODE ANN. §280.22 (2005), enacted May 11, 1989, clearly states, “students of
the public schools have the right to exercise freedom of speech, including the
right of expression in official school publications.” Id. § 280.22(1). The Code
limits student expression in so far as it may not include materials which are
obscene, libelous or slanderous, or which encourage students to commit
unlawful acts, violate school rules, or cause the material and substantial
disruption of the operation of the school. Id. § 280.22(2). See also Arkansas
Student Publications Act, ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-1201 – 6-18-1204 (2005);
Rights of Free Expression for Public School Students, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
22-1-120 (2005); The Student Publications Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-1504 –
1506 (2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.71, § 82 (West 2005); The California
Student Free Expression Law, CAL. EDUC. CODE §48907 (West 2005); The
Pennsylvania Administrative Code on Student Rights and Responsibilities, 22
PA. CODE § 12.9 (2005); The Washington Administrative Code on Student
Rights, WASH. ADMIN. CODE 180-40-215 (2005).
112
SPLC Report, ANTI-HAZELWOOD CAMPAIGNS LAUNCHED IN 3 STATES,
supra note 110.
113
See Vanderhurst v. Colo. Mountain Coll. Dist., 208 F.3d 908, 915 (10th
Cir. 2000) (“We need not decide definitively, however, whether that framework
does in fact govern a public college or university’s control over the classroom
speech of a professor or other instructor.”); Cummins v. Campbell, 44 F.3d 847
(10th Cir. 1994); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1074 (11th Cir. 1991)
(“[I]nsofar as [Hazelwood] covers the extent to which an institution may limit
in-school expressions which suggest the school’s approval, we adopt the Court’s
reasoning as suitable to our ends, even at the university level.”); Ala. Student
Party v. Student Gov’t Ass’n of the Univ. of Ala., 867 F.2d 1344 (11th Cir.
1989) (applying Hazelwood’s framework to determine that a university’s student
government association did not constitute a public forum); Welker v. Cicerone,
174 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1065 n.6 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (citing Hazelwood for the
proposition that there exists a “relaxed First Amendment standard” on college
campuses.); Lueth v. St. Clair County Cmty. Coll., 732 F. Supp. 2d 1410 (E.D.
Mich. 1990) (employing a critical comparison of student-run newspapers in high
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no consensus has yet been achieved. As one commentator noted,
“the only consistency that is apparent . . . is confusion.”114
C. Student Speech in Post-Secondary Education
The Hazelwood Court did not address the First Amendment
rights of college and university students. However, the Hazelwood
court did briefly mention the issue of free speech and higher
education in a footnote:
A number of lower federal courts have . . . recognized that
educators’ decisions with regard to the content of schoolsponsored newspapers, dramatic productions, and other
expressive activities are entitled to substantial deference.
We need not now decide whether the same degree of
deference is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored
expressive activities at the college and university level.115
In fact, until the recent decision in Hosty v. Carter, Hazelwood had
never been read as controlling outside the high school setting.
The ratification of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment in 1971,116
lowering the voting age to eighteen, essentially transformed
college students into legal adults. Accordingly, courts have
generally afforded college and university students broad First
Amendment protections. In the early 1970s, the Supreme Court
decided two cases that defined the free speech rights of students on
college and university campuses. Unlike Hazelwood, these cases
stood for the proposition that the First Amendment should apply
with equal force, both on and off campus. While the Court
emphasized the need for order and control, it held university
officials to a much more strict standard than that articulated in
Hazelwood.

schools and colleges, and concluding that Hazelwood is not applicable in a postsecondary setting.).
114
Schulz, supra note 103, at 1198.
115
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 n. 7 (citations omitted).
116
“The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age
or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of age.” U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, §1.
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The first of these decisions, Healy v. James,117 was handed
down in 1972. In Healy, Central Connecticut State College denied
official recognition to a group of students who wanted to form a
local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS).118
Pursuant to procedures established by the College, the students
petitioned the Student Affairs Committee for recognition.119 The
Committee, while satisfied with the stated purposes of the
group,120 harbored some concern over the relationship between the
proposed local chapter and the National SDS organization.121
Ultimately, though the Committee voted to approve the group, the
President of the College rejected the recommendation.122 As a
result, the students filed suit in district court claiming a violation of
their First Amendment rights of expression and association
stemming from the denial of recognition.123
The district court found for the school, holding that the First
Amendment did not require the College to approve of an
organization it believed “likely to cause violent acts of
disruption.”124 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed.125 The Supreme Court reversed.126 The Court identified
117

Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
Id. at 170.
119
Id. at 172.
120
Id. The group’s petition specified three distinct purposes: “It would
provide a forum of discussion and self-education for students developing an
analysis of American society; it would serve as an agency for integrating
thought with action so as to bring about constructive changes; and it would
endeavor to provide a coordinating body for relating the problems of leftist
students with other interested groups on campus and in the community.” Id.
(internal citations omitted).
121
The Court began by noting that the setting for this case was 1969-1970,
a period of unrest and often violence on campuses across the country. The
conflict in Vietnam sparked widespread civil disobedience and, noted the Court,
“SDS chapters on some of those campuses had been a catalytic force during this
period.” Id. at 171. Information on the SDS movement throughout the country is
available at http://www.sds.revolt.org/index.htm.
122
Healy, 408 U.S. at 175.
123
Id. at 177.
124
Healy v. James, 319 F. Supp. 113, 116 (D.C. Conn. 1970).
125
Healy v. James, 445 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1971).
118
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the conflicting interests at stake as those of students, faculty, and
administrators in maintaining an “environment free from disruptive
interference with the educational process,”127 and the “interest in
the widest latitude for free expression and debate consonant with
the maintenance of order.”128
Justice Powell’s analysis began with Tinker, acknowledging
that the First Amendment applies at the collegiate level.129 Further,
Powell noted that it is well established that both the State and
school officials have a need “consistent with fundamental
constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the
schools,”130 and, as per Tinker, to prohibit actions which
“materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the
school.”131 The Court, however, went on to distinguish Healy from
Tinker, noting that college students deserved the same
constitutional protections as the general public:
[T]he precedents of this Court leave no room for the view
that, because of the acknowledged need for order, First
Amendment protections should apply with less force on
college campuses than in the community at large. Quite to
the contrary, “[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional
freedoms is no where more vital than in the community of
American schools.” The college classroom with its
surrounding environs is peculiarly the “marketplace of
ideas,” and we break no new constitutional ground in
reaffirming this Nation’s dedication to safeguarding
academic freedom.132
126

Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972).
Id. at 171.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 180. “At the outset we note that state colleges and universities are
not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First Amendment. ‘It can hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.’” Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des
Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
130
Id. (internal citations omitted).
131
Id. at 189. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513).
132
Healy, 408 U.S. at 180-81. (internal citations omitted). See also
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (holding “[o]ur Nation
127
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The Court noted that while a college’s “legitimate interest in
preventing disruption on campus”133 might justify certain
restraints, a “heavy burden rests on the college to demonstrate the
appropriateness of the action.”134 That burden, said the Court, is
not met simply because the college declares the views expressed
by a particular group to be “abhorrent.”135
Less than one year after Healy, the Supreme Court again
addressed the issue of university student speech in Papish v. Board
of Curators of the University of Missouri.136 Barbara Papish, a
graduate student at the University of Missouri School of
Journalism, was expelled for distributing on campus an outside
newspaper that contained a cartoon depicting a policeman raping
the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice.137 Below the
cartoon was a caption that read “With Liberty and Justice for
All.”138 The issue also contained an article entitled “Motherfucker
is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom.”); United States v.
Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (holding “[t]he
Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that
robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a multitude of tongues,
[rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.”); Sweezy v. State of
N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957):
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American
universities is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate
the vital role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and
train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual
leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of
our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly comprehended
by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. Particularly is
that true in the social sciences, where few, if any, principles are
accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an
atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must
always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new
maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will
stagnate and die.
133
Healy v. James, 404 U.S. 169, 184 (1972).
134
Id.
135
Id. at 187-88.
136
410 U.S. 667 (1973).
137
Id. at 667.
138
Id.
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Acquitted,” which discussed the trial and acquittal of a New York
City youth who was a member of an organization called “Up
Against the Wall, Motherfucker.”139 Papish was expelled for
violation of the bylaws of the Board of Curators.140 She sued,
claiming that her activities were protected by the First
Amendment.141
In a per curiam opinion, the Court first noted that although
university officials undoubtedly have an ability to enforce
reasonable standards of student conduct, “Healy makes it clear that
the mere dissemination of ideas—no matter how offensive to good
taste—on a state university campus may not be shut off in the
name alone of ‘conventions of decency’” alone.142 The record
demonstrated that Papish was expelled because the school
disapproved of the content of the newspaper.143 Accordingly, the
University’s actions could not be viewed as a legitimate exercise of
its authority to enforce reasonable restrictions.144 The Court
concluded that “the First Amendment leaves no room for the
operation of a dual standard in the academic community with
respect to the content of speech.”145
In the more than thirty years since Healy and Papish, the
Supreme Court has not wavered. Rather, more recent decisions
emphasize the Court’s commitment to upholding First Amendment
rights on college and university campuses. For example, in
139

Id. at 667-68.
Id. at 668. The bylaws stated, in pertinent part:
Students enrolling in the University assume an obligation and are
expected by the University to conduct themselves in a manner
compatible with the University’s functions and missions as an
educational institution. For that purpose students are required to
observe generally accepted standards of conduct . . . . [I]ndecent
conduct or speech . . . are examples of conduct which would
contravene this standard.
Id. (quoting Papish v. Board of Curators of the Univ. of Missouri, 464 F.2d 136,
138 (8th Cir. 1972)) (alterations in original).
141
Id. at 669.
142
Papish, 410 U.S. at 670.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id. at 671.
140
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Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia,146
the Court held that the First Amendment prohibited a university
from denying funding to student publications, produced as
extracurricular activities, based on the views expressed therein.147
At issue in Rosenberger was a student-run publication, Wide
Awake, which provided a Christian perspective on community
issues.148 When Wide Awake Productions (WAP) requested money
from the Student Activity Fund (SAF) to cover the cost of
printing,149 its request was denied on the ground that Wide Awake
was a “religious activity” within the meaning of the school’s
guidelines.150 Unable to obtain funding, several members of the
group sued the University alleging that refusal to authorize
payment of printing costs violated their rights to freedom of speech
and press, to the free exercise of religion, and to equal protection
of the law.151
The Supreme Court held in favor of the students.152 The Court
found that because the University had offered to pay third-party
contractors on behalf of private speakers to convey their own
messages, it was not entitled to “silence the expression of selected

146

515 U.S. 819 (1995).
Id. at 845.
148
Id. at 825-26. Wide Awake was published by a student group known as
“Wide Awake Productions” (WAP). WAP was established “[t]o publish a
magazine of philosophical and religious expression,” “[t]o facilitate discussion
which fosters an atmosphere of sensitivity to and tolerance of Christian
viewpoints,” and “[t]o provide a unifying focus for Christians of multicultural
backgrounds.” Id. (citing party brief).
149
The University had established a Student Activity Fund (SAF) into
which all students were required to pay a fee. According to University
guidelines, the Student Council was authorized to disburse the funds to a variety
of student groups and organizations. Id. at 824-25.
150
Id. at 826. Excluded from Student Activity Fund support were religious
activities and political activities, among others. The Guidelines defined a
“religious activity” as any activity that “primarily promotes or manifests a
particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.” Id. at 825. (internal
citations omitted).
151
Id. at 827.
152
Papish, 410 U.S. at 845-46.
147
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viewpoints.”153 Accordingly, WAP could not constitutionally be
denied funding on the ground that it espoused a certain religious
perspective. Justice Kennedy explained:
Vital First Amendment speech principles are at stake here.
The first danger to liberty lies in granting the State the
power to examine publications to determine whether or not
they are based on some ultimate idea and, if so, for the
State to classify them. The second, and corollary, danger is
to speech from the chilling of individual thought and
expression. That danger is especially real in the University
setting, where the State acts against a background and
tradition of thought and experiment that is at the center of
our intellectual and philosophic tradition.154
The Court concluded that the University’s viewpoint-based denial
of funding for certain student expression amounted to “suppression
of free speech and creative inquiry in one of the vital centers for
the Nation’s intellectual life, its college and university
campuses.”155
Five years later in Board of Regents of the University of
Wisconsin System v. Southworth,156 the Supreme Court again
examined the First Amendment issues surrounding student-funded
speech. In Southworth, several students brought a First
Amendment claim against the University arguing that the
imposition of a mandatory activity fee violated their First
Amendment rights to free speech, free association, and free
exercise.157
The Supreme Court, balancing the First Amendment rights of
those students forced to subsidize the “objectionable speech of
others” against the University’s mission of encouraging a wide
range of speech,158 rejected the idea that the University should be
153

Id. at 835.
Id. (citing, Healy, 408 U.S. at 180-81; Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 683-84;
Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250).
155
Id. at 836.
156
529 U.S. 217 (2000).
157
Id. at 227.
158
Id. at 231. The Court went on to reaffirm the idea that college and
university campuses represent the “quintessential marketplace of ideas,” and the
154

NIMICK MACROED CORRECTED 07-30-6.DOC

7/30/2006 12:36 PM

FREE SPEECH ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES

967

required to restrict the types of ideas exchanged on campus.159
Justice Kennedy explained, “[t]he speech at the University . . . is
distinguished not by discernable limits but by its vast, unexplored
bounds.”160 Thus, requiring a school to limit student expression
“would be contrary to the very goal the University seeks to
pursue.”161
II. HOSTY V. CARTER162
James Tidwell, journalism professor and acting chair of the
department of journalism at Eastern Illinois University, recently
said, “In college and professional media, when a big decision
comes down, we tend to go around screaming, ‘The sky is
falling.’. . . When of course it isn’t.”163 The sky might not be
falling, but the storm clouds are certainly gathering. The Seventh
Circuit’s decision in Hosty v. Carter represents the first
unequivocal application of Hazelwood to post-secondary student
press,164 and stands in direct conflict with decisions in both the
school, as an agent of the State, seeks to “stimulate the whole universe of speech
and ideas.” Id. at 232.
159
Id. at 231.
160
Id. at 232.
161
Id.
162
412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. denied, 164 L. Ed. 2d 47
(2006).
163
SPLC News Flash, Student Media Experts React to Governors State
University Ruling, June 22, 2005; available at http://www.splc.org/newsflash.
asp?id=1039.
164
In Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S.
908, the Ninth Circuit applied Hazelwood, upholding as constitutional the
University of Santa Barbara’s refusal to grant a degree and file a master’s thesis
in its library system until Brown, a candidate for a master’s degree, removed
two pages of “disacknowledgments.” Id. at 943. The disacknowledgments page
began, “I would like to offer special Fuck You’s to the following degenerates.”
Id. Although the court applied Hazelwood’s framework, this case dealt with
speech that was decidedly part of the curriculum and that was considered
indecent. Therefore, although analogous in some respects to Hosty, because it
did not deal with student press, further discussion is beyond the scope of this
note. For a more comprehensive analysis of Brown, see e.g., Tom Saunders, The
Limits on University Control of Graduate Student Speech, 112 YALE L.J. 1295
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First and Sixth Circuits.165 The case has a lengthy procedural
history, including an unreported district court decision166 which
was affirmed by a Seventh Circuit panel.167 The full Seventh
Circuit, however, vacated the panel decision, and after rehearing
the case en banc, reversed the district court, holding in favor of the
University.168 On February 21, 2006, the United States Supreme
Court denied the students’ petition for certiorari, allowing the
Seventh Circuit’s decision to stand.169 The ruling carries with it
strong implications for the future of student speech and, especially
when viewed in light of the historical development of students’
free speech and press rights, is cause for alarm.
A. The Facts of Hosty v. Carter
As is true with most cases implicating the free speech rights of
students, Hosty involved a clash between a school’s administration
and its students. Governors State University (hereinafter
“Governors State” or “GSU”) is a state-run institution in
University Park, Illinois.170 With a student population of over
6,000, the school defines itself as an “upper-level university,”
offering undergraduate courses at the junior and senior level
leading to completion of a baccalaureate degree and graduate level
courses leading to a master’s degree.171 The now defunct
(2003).
165

Student Gov’t Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Mass, 868 F.2d 473,
480 n.6 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that Hazelwood “is not applicable to college
newspapers.”); Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 346 n.5 (6th Cir. 2001) (en
banc) (holding that Hazelwood had “little application” to a case involving
censorship of a college yearbook).
166
Hosty v. Governors State Univ., No. 01-C-500, 2001 WL 1465621
(N.D. Ill. 2001).
167
Hosty v. Carter, 325 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2003).
168
See Hosty, 412 F.3d at 739 (determining that the school, and specifically
Dean Carter, had not violated the students’ First Amendment rights).
169
Hosty v. Carter, 421 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 164 L. Ed.
2d 47 (2006).
170
Information regarding Governors State University is available on the
University’s website, http://www.govst.edu.
171
Id.
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INNOVATOR172 is described as “the bimonthly student newspaper
and [] the main source of information about campus life.”173
Controversy surrounding the publication and, in particular, its last
issue, sparked the current lawsuit.
When the case began, the three plaintiffs in Hosty, Jeni Porche,
Margaret Hosty, and Steven Barba, were students at Governors
State, appointed in May 2000 by the school’s Student
Communications Media Board (SCMB) to serve as the
INNOVATOR’s editor-in-chief, managing editor, and staff reporter,
respectively.174 According to SCMB guidelines at the time, the
staff of the INNOVATOR was responsible for determining the
content and format of the paper “without censorship or advance
approval.”175 The paper’s faculty advisor, Geoffroy de LaForcade,
often read stories intended for publication and offered guidance on
issues of journalistic standards and ethics.176 Although it was
customary for the advisor to sign-off on each edition before it was
sent to the printer, the student editors and writers were given
complete editorial control concerning the paper’s subject matter
and content.177 GSU had a contract with Regional Publishing
Corporation to print the Innovator on a bi-monthly basis,178 with
the cost of publication covered entirely by money from Student
Activity Fees.179
172

Id. The last issue was published on October 31, 2000 and, in the fall of
2002, a new incarceration of the newspaper appeared at GSU, calling itself the
Phoenix.
173
Id.
174
Hosty, 325 F.3d at 946.
175
Id.; see also the GSU Student Handbook, Student Media Policy
(declaring that the “[t]he staff will determine the content and format of their
respective publications without censorship or advance approval.”), available at,
http://www.collegefreedom.org/GSUhandbook.htm.
176
Hosty, 2001 WL 1465621 at *1.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
According to the GSU website, “The Student Activity fee is $32 per
trimester. The fee supports programs and activities to enrich the extracurricular
life of students.” This fee is mandatory and, once collected, is deposited into the
Student Activity Fund. For a more thorough explanation of the collection and
distribution of fees, see http://www.govst.edu/ sas/t_hb.asp?id=2995.
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According de LaForcade, the INNOVATOR made “great strides
as a serious newspaper and a voice for students’ interests.”180
Porche, Hosty, and the rest of the staff were determined to
establish a reputable, informative and critical publication—a goal
they made clear in the premiere issue, published July 10, 2000,
under an editorial entitled “New Beginnings.”181 The editorial read,
in part, “[w]e look forward to having a productive year and raising
important issues concerning life at GSU. By making these issues
public, we hope to spark debates that will enhance the educational
environment for everyone.”182
After articles bearing Hosty’s by-line attacked the integrity of
Roger K. Oden, Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, the
University’s administration began to take an interest in the
paper.183 On October 31, 2000, the INNOVATOR published a letter
to the editor from de Laforcade whose employment with the
University had been terminated effective August 31, 2000.184 The
same issue of the paper also contained an article entitled “De
Laforcade’s Contract Dispute Reaches 3rd Phase Arbitration,”
under the by-line of M.L. Hosty.185 In response to the letter and
article, both Dean Oden and Stuart Fagan, President of the
University, issued statements accusing the INNOVATOR of
irresponsible and defamatory journalism. Oden wrote, “Geoffrey
de Laforcade’s letter to the editor and M. L. Hosty’s article is [sic]
a collection of untruths and I believe that they know they are
untrue.”186 President Fagan, describing the October 31st issue as
“an angry barrage of unsubstantiated allegations,” vowed not to
180

Press Statement by Faculty Advisor, Geoffroy de LaForcade (Feb. 16,
2001); available at http://www.collegefreedom.org/Advisor21601.htm.
181
Email conversation with Margaret L. Hosty, Nov. 4, 2005. On file with
author.
182
Id.
183
Hosty, 412 F.3d at 732-33.
184
Dean Roger Oden’s denunciation of the INNOVATOR (Nov. 2, 2000),
available at http://www.collegefreedom.org/Oden.htm.
185
The front page of the October 31, 2000 issue of the INNOVATOR is
available on the Student Press Law Center’s website at http://www.splc.org/
pdf/innovator.pdf.
186
Oden, supra note 184.
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“sit idly by, without comment, and allow the reputation of the
university to be sullied by newspaper reporting that is inaccurate,
insulting, and that might be driven, in part, by self-interest.”187
In late October and early November of 2000, Patricia Carter,
Dean of Student Affairs and Services, twice called Charles
Richards, president of Regional Publishing.188 In those calls, Dean
Carter told Richards not to print future issues of the INNOVATOR
without prior approval of the newspaper’s content by a GSU
administrator.189 She instructed Richards to call her when he
received future issues.190
In a November 14, 2000 memo delivered to the staff at the
INNOVATOR, Richards relayed the substance of his conversations
with Dean Carter.191 Richards stated that he had agreed to call
Carter regarding future issues of the paper but noted that his
understanding was that the law precluded a condition of approval
prior to printing.192 However, he also noted that he was “not an
attorney, so the final decision on the proper handling of this matter
should not be left to [him].”193 The INNOVATOR’s staff
interpreted Richards’ comments to mean that Regional Publishing
would not print additional editions of the paper until the issue of
prior review was settled.194 A company representative confirmed
that it was not willing to risk printing the paper and not getting
paid195 and publication stopped in November 2000.196
Carter’s demand for prior review and approval prompted
Hosty, Porche and Barba to file suit in April 2001 in United States
187

Governors State University President Fagan denounces the
INNOVATOR (Nov. 3, 2000), available at http://www.collegefreedom.org/
Fagan.htm.
188
Hosty, 412 F.3d at 733.
189
Hosty, 325 F.3d at 947.
190
Id.
191
Id.; a copy of this memo is available at http://www.collegefreedom.
org/Printer.htm.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Hosty, 325 F.3d at 947.
196
Id.
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District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division.197 The students sued the University, the Board of
Trustees, administrators and staff members, alleging prior restraint
in violation of the First Amendment and entitlement to equitable
relief and punitive damages.198 Summary judgment was granted as
to some defendants because, in the district court judge’s view, they
did not participate in the challenged conduct;199 others were
granted qualified immunity.200 The district court found, however,
that there was sufficient evidence to show that Dean Carter’s
phone calls amounted to an unconstitutional prior restraint and that
her conduct was intentionally unlawful, negating her claim to
qualified immunity.201 Dean Carter appealed, and, on April 10,
2003, a panel of the Seventh Circuit unanimously affirmed the
order of the district court and remanded the case for trial.202 On
June 23, 2003, however, the Seventh Circuit granted Carter’s
petition for a rehearing en banc, and vacated its April 10th
decision.203

197

Hosty v. Governors St. Univ., 174 F. Supp. 2d 782 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13,

2001).
198

Id. at 783.
Hosty, 2001 WL 1465621, *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2001). The students
sued for alleged First Amendment violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. As
the district court noted, “In §1983 actions, an individual cannot be held liable
unless he caused or participated in the asserted constitutional violation.” Id.
Plaintiffs claimed that certain individuals at the school failed to adequately
investigate Dean Carter’s phone calls. However, summary judgment was
granted with respect to these individuals because, as the court noted, “[a]
supervisor’s negligence in detecting unconstitutional conduct is insufficient to
hold the supervisor liable.” Id.
200
Id. at *5. As the district court noted, according to the doctrine of
qualified immunity, “government officials performing discretionary functions,
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
201
Id. at *7. Ultimately, the district court granted the motion for summary
judgment to all except for Dean Patricia Carter.
202
Hosty, 325 F.3d at 950.
203
Id. at 731.
199
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B. Hosty v. Carter: Seventh Circuit En Banc Decision
By a 7-4 vote, the full Seventh Circuit reversed the order of the
district court and sent the seventeen-year-old Hazelwood doctrine
to college.204 Judge Easterbrook, writing for the majority, declared
that Hazelwood’s footnote seven205 was not dispositive.206 Simply
because the Supreme Court reserved the question did not mean that
post-secondary educators may never insist that student newspapers
be subject to prior approval. According to the majority, “this
footnote does not even hint at the possibility of an on/off switch:
high school papers reviewable, college papers not reviewable. . . .
Whether some review is possible depends on the answer to the
public forum question, which does not (automatically) vary with
the speakers’ age.”207 Because age is not dispositive where a public
forum analysis applies, the court concluded that “Hazelwood’s
framework applies to subsidized student newspapers at colleges as
well as elementary and secondary schools.”208
The court then addressed whether the INNOVATOR should be

204

Hosty, 412 F.3d at 731.
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 n.7 (1988) (“We
need not now decide whether the same degree of deference is appropriate with
respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and university
level.”).
206
Hosty, 412 F.3d at 734.
207
Id.
208
Id. at 735. In his analysis, Easterbrook noted that to the extent that the
justification for editorial control hinges on the audience’s maturity, the
difference between high school and college students may be important. Id. at
734. Easterbrook hedged this declaration, however, reasoning that there could be
no bright line between college and high school students, as many high school
seniors are older than some college freshmen, and that many junior colleges are
strikingly similar to high schools. Id. Further, the court concluded that to the
extent that the justification for editorial control depends on other matters, such
as the desire to ensure high standards of student speech, i.e., speech that might
be deemed ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, vulgar or
profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences, there is no sharp difference
between student newspapers at the high school and college levels. Id. at 734-35.
For a discussion of the public forum doctrine and its general applicability, see
supra note 72.
205
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characterized as a public forum.209 If the paper had operated as a
public forum, the First Amendment would have prohibited the
University’s prior restraint.210 If, however, the INNOVATOR
operated as a nonpublic forum, there could be no First Amendment
violation as long as Dean Carter’s insistence on prior review was
motivated by “legitimate pedagogical concerns.”211 Based on the
record, the majority found it impossible to determine what kind of
forum the University had established or to evaluate Carter’s
motivation.212 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the student plaintiffs, however, the court concluded a reasonable
finder of fact might have found that the INNOVATOR constituted a
public forum and was, thus, beyond the control of University
administrators.213
Ultimately, although the student paper did not operate as a
traditional public forum, the court concluded that the University
had established the INNOVATOR as a designated or limited public
forum.214 It was undisputed that the Student Communications
Media Board dictated the terms on which the INNOVATOR
operated.215 The Board was the ultimate publisher of the
INNOVATOR and other subsidized student media.216 The Board
determined how many publications it would underwrite, and its
209

Id. at 736.
Id. at 737 (citing Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546
(1975)); see also, Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educator’s Ass’n, 460 U.S.
37, 45 (1983).
211
Id. at 737.
212
Hosty, 412 F.3d at 737.
213
Id. The court notes here, as well as earlier in its opinion that, when
entertaining an interlocutory appeal by a public official seeking the privilege of
qualified immunity, the threshold question is: “Taken in the light most favorable
to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the [public official’s]
conduct violated a constitutional right?” Id. at 733 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (alterations in original)).
214
Id. ([t]he court held that the INNOVATOR constituted a designated
public forum, “where the editors were empowered to make their own decisions,
wise or foolish, without fear that the administration would stop the presses.”).
Id. at 738.
215
Id. at 737.
216
Id.
210
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policy dictated that the staff of each funded publication would be
free to determine content and format without censorship or
advance approval.217 The University had declared the pages of the
student newspaper open for expression and had thereby
relinquished its right to engage in viewpoint or content
discrimination.218
Having established that Hazelwood’s applicability turned on a
public forum analysis,219 the court next addressed Dean Carter’s
claim of qualified immunity.220 Even assuming that both the
district court and the Seventh Circuit panel were correct in their
reasoning that student media in high schools and colleges operate
under different constitutional frameworks, the court concluded that
it “greatly overstates the certainty of the law” to say that any
reasonable college administrator would have known that rule.221
Relying on what it perceived as a split among the circuits, the
Court of Appeals found that post-Hazelwood decisions had not
“clearly established” that college administrators may not regulate
student media.222 Citing Axson-Flynn v. Johnson223 and Bishop v.
Arnov,224 the court concluded that at least two circuits had applied
Hazelwood to the administrative actions at both the college and
217

Id. The court also noted that the funds for publications which the Board
had conceded to underwrite were, as was the case in both Southworth and
Rosenberger, derived entirely from student activity fees. For a discussion of
Rosenberger, Southworth, and student speech subsidized by a mandatory student
activity fee, see discussion supra Part IC.
218
Hosty, 412 F.3d at 737. Judge Easterbrook explained that participants in
a designated or limited public forum, such as the INNOVATOR, which was
declared open to speech ex ante, “may not be censored ex post when the sponsor
decides that particular speech is unwelcome.” Id.
219
Id. at 737-38.
220
Id.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d 1277, 1289 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that “the
Hazelwood framework is applicable in a university setting for speech that occurs
in a classroom as part of a class curriculum.”).
224
Bishop, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that Hazelwood’s
framework allows a university to order a professor to stop interjecting his
personal religious views into classroom discussion.).
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high school levels.225 The court relied on Student Government
Association v. University of Massachusetts,226 and Kincaid v.
Gibson227 to highlight the circuit split.228 Given this apparent
confusion among the circuits regarding that applicability of
Hazelwood to post-secondary education, and despite the fact that
the INNOVATOR was operating as a limited public forum and thus
exempt from university control, the court concluded that Dean
Carter was entitled to qualified immunity.229
C. Hosty v. Carter: The Dissent
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Evans attacked the majority’s
contention that there is no legal distinction between college and
high school students.230 He noted that, in reality, “[t]he Court has
long recognized that the status of minors under the law is unique in
many respects.”231 Age, according to the Supreme Court, has
always defined legal rights:
Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of
majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the
Constitution and possess constitutional rights. The Court,
indeed, however, long has recognized that the State has
somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of
children than of adults.232
225

Hosty, 412 F.3d at 738.
868 F.2d 743, 480 n.6 (1st Cir. 1989) (asserting, in reliance on
Hazelwood’s footnote 7, that the Supreme Court has held that Hazelwood’s
approach does not apply to post-secondary education.).
227
236 F.3d 342, 345 n.5 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (holding that, in reliance
on the parties’ agreement, Hazelwood has “little application” to collegiate
publications.).
228
Hosty, 412 F.3d at 738-39. The majority also cited Brown v. Li, 308
F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002), to illustrate the claim that many aspects of the law with
respect to student speech are difficult to understand and apply. Id. at 739.
229
Id. at 739.
230
Id. (Evans, J., dissenting).
231
Id. (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979)).
232
Id. at 740. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428
226
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Citing Healy and its progeny, Evans noted that the Supreme
Court has consistently drawn a bright line between high school and
college students and that age has always defined the extent of a
student’s right to freedom of speech.233
According to the dissent, this distinction between high school
students and college students who are, for all intents and purposes,
“young adults,” 234 has been drawn because students in high school
are less mature than their collegiate counterparts and the missions
of secondary schools and institutions of higher learning are vastly
different.235 Analysis of these differences render Hazelwood
inapplicable outside of the high school context.236
The dissent addressed the maturity distinction first, arguing
that “[i]t is self-evident that, as a general matter, juveniles are less
mature than adults.”237 It continued, “[a]t least in some precisely
delineated areas, a child—like someone in a captive audience—is
not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is
the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees.”238 It was this
reasoning that dictated the outcome in Hazelwood and Fraser.239 In
Hazelwood, the Supreme Court stressed that, because in a high
school setting the students are young, immature, and more
U.S. 52, 74 (1976)) (internal citations omitted).
233
Id. For further discussion of Healy, Rosenberger and Southworth, see
discussion supra Part IC.
234
Hosty, 421 F.3d at 739 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.
14 (1981)).
235
Id.
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
Id. (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-650 (1968)
(Stewart, J., concurring) (footnote omitted)); see also Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672, 686 (1981) (holding that as a general rule, college students are less
impressionable than students in primary and secondary schools); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992) (noting that “there are heightened concerns
with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the
elementary and secondary public schools.”); Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635 (holding
that “during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack
the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that
could be detrimental to them.”).
239
Hosty, 412 F.3d at 740.
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vulnerable to inappropriate influence, a more restrictive First
Amendment standard was appropriate.240 Given the maturity level
of the audience involved, it was reasonable for the school to
restrict publication of articles concerning divorce, juvenile
delinquency, and teen pregnancy.241 Similarly, in Fraser, where
the Court permitted the school to sanction a lewd and suggestive
speech given by a student at a school-sponsored assembly, the
Court stressed that “[t]he speech could well be seriously damaging
to its less mature audience.”242 The dissent in Hosty argued that
these “same concerns simply do not apply to college students, who
are certainly (as a general matter) more mature, independent
thinkers.”243
The dissent also compared the respective missions of high
schools and those of colleges and universities and found the two
were vastly different.244 Elementary and secondary schools have
“custodial and tutelary responsibilities for children”245 and are, in
large part, concerned with the “inculcation” of “values.”246 A
university, on the other hand, represents the quintessential
“marketplace of ideas”247—seeking to “facilitate a wide range of
speech.”248 Citing Healy’s teaching that “[t]he precedents of [the
240

Id. (citing Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272).
Id.
242
Id. (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683-84) (emphasis added).
243
Id. at 741.
244
Id.
245
Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822, 829-30 (2002)).
246
Id. (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683).
247
Id. (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S.
589, 603 (1967)).
248
Id. (citing Southworth, 529 U.S. at 231). For further support, the dissent
cites to Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 836 (holding that permitting such censorship
on college and university campuses “risks the suppression of free speech and
creative inquiry in one of the vital centers for the Nation’s intellectual life.”); see
also, Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (arguing that
an atmosphere of “speculation, experiment and creation” is “essential to the
quality of higher education.”) (internal citations omitted); Widmar, 454 U.S. at
267-68 n. 5 (holding that “[t]he college classroom with its surrounding environs
is peculiarly the marketplace of ideas.”).
241
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Supreme Court] leave no room for the view that . . . First
Amendment protections should apply with less force on college
campuses than in the community at large,” the dissent in Hosty
contended that it is inappropriate to extend Hazelwood to postsecondary education.249 “This court,” it declared, “gives the green
light to school administrators to restrict student speech in a manner
inconsistent with the First Amendment.”250
Finally, the dissent rejected the majority’s conclusion that
Dean Carter was entitled to qualified immunity.251 Prior to
Hazelwood, courts consistently held that university administrators
could not require prior review of student media.252 Hazelwood, the
dissent reasoned, did not change this rule. For purposes of
qualified immunity, then, the question was whether any case
following Hazelwood could have suggested to a reasonable person
in Dean Carter’s position that she could prohibit publication of a
student newspaper simply because she was opposed to its
content.253 For the dissent, the answer was clearly “no.”254 In
support of this conclusion, the dissent cited directly contradicting
authority from Student Government Association and Kincaid.255
The dissent also explicitly rejected the majority’s reliance on
Bishop and Axson-Flynn, noting that both concerned free speech
rights in the classroom.256 Furthermore, although the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Axson-Flynn, acknowledged that
some courts (namely the First and Sixth) had cast doubt on
Hazelwood’s application to extracurricular curricular activities, it
249

Hosty, 412 F.3d at 741-42. For a more in-depth discussion of Healy and
its progeny, see supra Part IC.
250
Hosty, 412 F.3d. at 742.
251
Id.
252
Id.
253
Id. at 743.
254
Id. Whereas the majority picked up on Hazelwood’s footnote seven and
asked whether post-Hazelwood decisions had “clearly established that college
administrators must keep hands off all student newspapers,” the dissent framed
the question differently. It asked whether decisions after Hazelwood said
anything to suggest that college administrators could censor school newspapers.
Id. at n. 3.
255
Id. at 743.
256
Hosty, 412 F.3d at 743.
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explicitly stated that “because Axson-Flynn’s speech occurred as
part of a curricular assignment during class time and in the
classroom, [it would] not reach any analysis of university’s
students’ extracurricular speech.”257 In sum, because it was
“clearly established” that the University could not deny funding to
the student paper simply because it found its contents offensive
and, accordingly, the dissent concluded Dean Carter’s request for
immunity should have been denied.258
D. The Aftermath of the Seventh Circuit’s Pronouncement
Reaction to the proceedings in Hosty has been extensive. Citing
the effect that the ruling could have on student free speech rights,
both the student and popular press have written extensively on the
topic. Praising the now vacated Seventh Circuit panel’s decision,
Mark Goodman, executive director of the Student Press Law
Center, stated that it reaffirmed the last thirty years of college
censorship cases.259 He hoped that this ruling would “dissuade—
once and for all—college officials who are inclined to censor from
engaging in that unconstitutional behavior.”260 The Chicago
Tribune reported that the student plaintiffs were “stunned and
thrilled by the ruling.”261 Jim Killam, former president of the
Illinois College Press Association called the panel’s decision “an
overwhelming confirmation . . . that these students were right.”262
Reaction continued following the Seventh Circuit’s en banc
ruling. This time, however, the reaction was mainly hostile.
“Beware the ruling that opens with a condescending joke,”263
257

Id. at 743-44 (quoting Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1286 n.6 (emphasis
added) (internal citations omitted)).
258
Id. at 744.
259
SPLC Press Release, SPLC Praises Appellate Court Decision that
Upholds College Press Rights, Apr. 10, 2003; available at http://www.splc.
org/newsflash.asp?id=598.
260
Id.
261
Richard Wronski, Court Rips College for Censoring Paper; Appeals
Panel Decides Against Governors State, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 11, 2003, at 6 (Metro).
262
Id.
263
Judge Easterbrook wrote, “[c]ontroversy began to swirl when Jeni
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began one commentator, concluding that “Hazelwood is now
inside the gates.”264 Mark Goodman noted that although student
newspapers have traditionally been presumed to operate as public
forums, the decision “gives schools the chance to argue that’s not
what they intended.”265 Greg Lukianoff, Director of Legal and
Public Advocacy for the Foundation for Individual Rights in
Education (“FIRE”), opined that “[t]he summer of 2005 will be
remembered as a rough season for student rights.”266 Margaret
Hosty, the titular student plaintiff, called the decision “disastrous”
and worried that it would not be limited to journalists, but might be
extended to other areas of student expression.267 Some even went
so far as to say that “[i]ndependent college journalism may soon be
a relic of the past—on par with typewriters and eight-track cassette
players—in at least three states, and potentially throughout the
country.”268
Although the majority of the commentary on the Hosty
decision has been negative—even alarmist—others are not as
concerned. The decision in Hosty was based, in large part, on the
INNOVATOR’s status as a limited public forum. Scholars have
surmised that “a vast majority of college newspapers would be
found to be public forums,” and, as such, have concluded that
Hosty might not have a “great negative impact.”269 A
Porche became editor in chief of the INNOVATOR, the student newspaper at
Governors State University. None of the articles concerned the apostrophe
missing from the University’s name. Instead the students tackled meatier fare.”
Hosty, 412 F.3d at 732.
264
“Hazelwood” Goes to College; Another Seventh Circuit Ruling, Another
Defeat for the Press, CHICAGO READER, Vol. 34, Iss. 40. July 1, 2005.
265
Student Media Experts React to Governors State University Ruling,
supra note 163.
266
Greg Lukianoff, Wronging Student Rights. BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 3,
2005, OP-Ed, at A17.
267
Rudolph Bush, College Paper Lawsuit Fails; Federal Court Backs
Governors State Dean. CHI. TRIB., June 21, 2005, Metro, at 1.
268
Harvey A. Silverglate, Assault on College Press; FIRST AMENDMENT.
NAT’L L. J., Oct. 17, 2005, Vol.27, No.56, at 23. Mr. Silverglate’s reference to
“at least three states” refers to the states within the jurisdiction of the Seventh
Circuit – Wisconsin, Illinois and Indiana.
269
See Student Media Experts React to Governors State University Ruling,

NIMICK MACROED CORRECTED 07-30-6.DOC

982

7/30/2006 12:36 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

determination of forum status might be much more difficult of
other student-funded expressive activities.270 So, while most
student media enjoy a history of operating as a public forum, “[a]
student group that brings speakers or shows films on campus may
not have easily demonstrated that same tradition.”271 The real fear
then, is not what will happen to student-run newspapers on college
campuses, but how Hazelwood might be expanded to censor all
forms of speech.272
III. THE CASE AGAINST APPLYING HAZELWOOD TO INSTITUTIONS OF
HIGHER LEARNING
With the historical backdrop of First Amendment jurisprudence
in mind, it becomes clear that the Seventh Circuit’s decision in
Hosty was wrongly decided and that Hazelwood’s framework
should not be applied to student speech on college and university
campuses. In Hazelwood, the Court held that “educators do not
offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over
the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored
expressive activities so long as their concerns are reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”273 For a number of
reasons, such a restrictive standard is inappropriate and ultimately
unworkable at the collegiate level.
A. Inherent Fundamental Differences Between High School
and College Students
The significant differences between high school students and
their collegiate counterparts weigh heavily against applying
Hazelwood outside of the confines of secondary education. First,
high school students are almost exclusively minors, while college
students are almost exclusively adults.274 The Supreme Court has
supra note 163.
270
Id.
271
Id.
272
See discussion infra Part III.
273
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
274
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, only .9% of undergraduate
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regularly highlighted the importance of this distinction. In Widmar
v. Vincent,275 the Court held that “[u]niversity students are, of
course, young adults. They are less impressionable than younger
students.”276 Nine years earlier in Healy v. James, Justice Douglas
wrote, “[s]tudents—who, by reason of the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment, become eligible to vote when 18 years of age—are
adults who are members of the college or university.”277
Numerous lower courts have recognized the significance of this
difference as well. For example, in upholding a high school’s
prohibition of the distribution of an unofficial newspaper on its
campus, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit cautioned that
its decision only applied to “minors,” and not to university
students, because “few college students are minors, and colleges
are traditionally places of virtually unlimited free expression.”278
In Bradshaw v. Rawlings, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit highlighted some of the many ways in which college
students are treated as adults:
College students today are no longer minors; they are
now regarded as adults in almost every phase of
community life. They may vote, marry, make a will,
qualify as a personal representative, serve as a guardian of
the estate of a minor, wager at racetracks, register as a
public accountant, practice veterinary medicine, qualify as
students are below the age of 18. See 2003 U.S. Census Bureau Current
Population Survey (CPS) Rep., Table E, College Enrollment by Selected
Characteristics: October 2003.
275
454 U.S. 263 (1981).
276
Id. at 274 n. 14.
277
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 197 (1972); see also Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (holding that “minors often lack the experience
perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be
detrimental to them.”); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971)
(upholding a federal law that provided funding to church-related colleges and
universities for the construction of facilities to be used exclusively for secular
educational purposes, the Court noted that while pre-college students may not
have the maturity to make their own decisions concerning such weighty matters
such as religion, “college students are less impressionable and less susceptible to
religious indoctrination.”). See also discussion supra Part IC.
278
Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 822 F.2d 747, 750 (8th Cir. 1987).
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a practical nurse, drive trucks, ambulances and other
official fire vehicles, perform general fire-fighting duties,
and qualify as a private detective. [At age eighteen]
criminal acts are no longer treated as those of a juvenile,
and eighteen year old students may waive their testimonial
privilege protecting confidential statements to school
personnel.279
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, upholding a high school’s decision
to prohibit advertisements for Planned Parenthood in its school
publications, recognized that “educators must have the ability to
consider the ‘emotional maturity of the intended audience.’”280 It
was this very concern for the maturity level of the speaker and the
intended audience that concerned the Supreme Court in both
Fraser and Hazelwood.
In Fraser, the Supreme Court’s central focus was the
immaturity of the audience subject to Fraser’s sexually suggestive
speech. The Court noted that, “The speech could well be seriously
damaging to its less mature audience, many of whom were only 14
years old and on the threshold of awareness of human
sexuality.”281 Similar concerns were raised by the Court in
Hazelwood:
279

612 F.2d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1979) (internal footnotes omitted); see also,
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 853 (1988) (noting that “[l]egislatures
recognize the relative immaturity of adolescents, and we have often permitted
them to define age-based classes that take account of this qualitative difference
between juveniles and adults.”) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
280
Planned Parenthood of S. Nev., Inc. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 941
F.2d 817, 829 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272); see also
Sypniewski v. Warren Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 267 (3d Cir. 2002)
(holding that the public school setting is “fundamentally different” from the
university setting because high school students are “minors.”); Beach v. Univ. of
Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 418 (Utah 1986) (holding that “[we] do not believe that [a
college student] should be viewed as fragile and in need of protection simply
because she had the luxury of attending an institution of higher learning.”);
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 429-30 (1992) (noting “the distinctive
character of a university environment, or a secondary school environment,
influences our First Amendment analysis.”) (Stevens, J., concurring).
281
Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683-84 (1986) (internal
citations omitted).
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A school must be able to take into account the emotional
maturity of the intended audience in determining whether
to disseminate student speech on potentially sensitive
topics, which might range from the existence of Santa
Claus in an elementary school setting to the particulars of
teenage sexual activity in a high school setting.282
The Court’s heavy reliance on age and maturity level in
deciding these cases make it clear that Hazelwood’s framework is
inapplicable in a college setting. Seizing on this difference, the
dissent in Hosty argued that the majority had failed to recognize
this distinction.283 The dissent highlighted the fact that the students
in Hazelwood were high school students while those in Hosty were
in college, and that the Hazelwood Court itself had acknowledged
the potential for different treatment of college students.284 Noting
the emphasis the Supreme Court has consistently placed on the
maturity level of the speaker and audience at issue, the dissent
concluded that “[t]he same concerns simply do not apply to college
students, who are certainly (as a general matter) more mature,
independent thinkers.”285 This distinction, it argued, made it “clear
that Hazelwood does not apply beyond high school contact.”286
In other words, “the university campus should be considered to
society at large.”287 College students are afforded far more rights
than their high school counterparts,288 and the typical college
experience is devoid of most of the traditional features of precollege life.289 Moreover, because attendance is not compulsory,
282

Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988).
Hosty, 412 F.3d at 739 (Evans, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s
conclusion flows from an incorrect premisethat there is no legal distinction
between college and high school students.”).
284
Id. at 739-40.
285
Id. at 741.
286
Id. at 740.
287
Greg C. Tenhoff, Censoring the Public University Student Press: A
Constitutional Challenge, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 511, 535 (1991).
288
Id. (“American society bestows upon new adults full legal rights and
responsibilities; with these rights and responsibilities, unfortunately, comes
exposure to the unpleasant elements of society.”).
289
See Fiore, supra note 103, at 1957.
283
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college and university students should not be considered a “captive
audience.”290 As one commentator put it, “[i]n the university
context, the focus is not on children in the public schools who need
to be sheltered from harms inherent in the community at large . . . .
At some point, society needs to send its young adults to face the
world, with all its unpleasantries and hazards.”291
B. The Respective Missions of High Schools and Universities
In a similar vein, the respective missions of universities and
high schools are entirely different. In Fraser, the Supreme Court
recognized that primary and secondary schools “must inculcate the
habits and manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to
happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-government
in the community and the nation.”292 By contrast, the Supreme
Court, in Healy, recognized that “the college classroom with its
surrounding environs is peculiarly the “‘marketplace of ideas.’”293
As one commentator concluded, “While inculcating values in
children is arguably necessary to an orderly society, such a purpose
290

Tenhoff, supra note 287 (“university students are not a captive audience
as are high school students.”).
291
Id. See also Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 876 (1982) (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979) (holding
“[t]oday, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for
education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to
our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic
public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation
of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping
him to adjust normally to his environment.”) (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
292
Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (internal citations
omitted).
293
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972); see also Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (holding that “[t]he
classroom is peculiarly the “marketplace of ideas.” The Nation’s future depends
upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas
which discovers truth “out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any
kind of authoritative selection.”) (internal citations omitted).
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has no place in the world of adults. Adults must be considered to
have the ability to shape their own values outside the realm of
institutional coercion.”294
Hosty involved students on a university campus. In fact, more
than a typical college or university, Governors State defines itself
as “An upper-division university: [offering] undergraduate courses
at the junior and senior level leading to completion of a
baccalaureate degree and graduate level courses leading to a
master’s degree.”295 The average age of the students at GSU is 33
and 71% of the student body are women, many of whom are single
working mothers.296 Certainly these students, many of them
parents themselves, should not be subject to the same restrictive
Hazelwood standard applicable to their younger, high school
counterparts. Extending Hazelwood in such circumstances opens
the door for censorship of student speech not only at the
undergraduate level, but at the post-graduate level as well. Taken
to this extreme, even students studying for a masters degree in
journalism might be subject to administrative censorship.
Commenting on this absurdity, one scholar noted, “[with the ruling
in Hosty] we’re going to have students learning journalism for
eight years under conditions that bear no resemblance to real
conditions.”297
Moreover, GSU states as one of its missions (a statement that is
typical of most colleges and universities),298 “To cultivate and
enlarge a diverse and intellectually stimulating community of
learners guided by a culture that embodies: Openness of
294

Tenhoff, supra note 287, at 530.
Governors State University website, Facts and Figures, http://www.
govst.edu/aboutgsu/t_aboutgsu.asp?id=204.
296
Id.
297
Irwin Gratz, president of the Society of Professional Journalists, in the
Student Press Law Center Fall 2005 Report, at 24; available at
http://www.splc.org/report_detail.asp?id=1239&edition=37.
298
The Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (“FIRE”), a nonprofit organization dedicated to the protection of free speech rights on campuses
across the country, provides a service on its website that allows visitors to search
for any college or university in the nation. Once a school is selected, FIRE’s
website provides links to relevant school policies such as sexual harassment
policies, speech codes, and mission statements. See http://www.thefire.org.
295

NIMICK MACROED CORRECTED 07-30-6.DOC

988

7/30/2006 12:36 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

communication; diversity of backgrounds, experiences, and
perspectives; mutual respect and cooperation; critical inquiry,
constant questioning, and continuing assessment.”299 Given this,
censoring student speech, simply because it offends the
administration, is not only an unconstitutional violation of the First
Amendment, but also runs afoul not only of the stated mission of
the school but also the well-established view of the nation’s
universities as the quintessential marketplace of ideas.
C. Application of a Public Forum Analysis
Application of the public forum doctrine in the context of
college student publications is improper.300 Forum analysis
presumes that simply by virtue of proximity to or financial control
over the expressive venue, the government may lawfully control
otherwise constitutionally protected speech. In Hazelwood, the
Supreme Court applied a public forum analysis, concluding that
because the student newspaper in question was a non-public forum,
school officials were within their rights to control its content.301
Traditional public forum analysis, while logical when applied to a
high school setting, is simply unworkable at the university level.
Rarely have courts relied on public forum analysis in order to
determine the level of First Amendment protections to which
collegiate student speech is entitled.302 Instead, although most
court decisions suggest some type of forum analysis, it is apparent
that courts have simply assumed that as editors of a student
publication, college-aged students are given the authority to
determine the content of the medium.303
299

Governors
State
University
website,
Mission
Statement,
http://www.govst.edu/sas/t_hb.asp?id=2933.
300
For a more detailed discussion of the public forum doctrine, see supra
note 72.
301
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 269-70 (1988). In
making its determination, the Court considered several factors. For a more
detailed discussion of the Court’s considerations, see discussion supra Part IA3.
302
Student Press Law Center, Law of the Student Press 53 (2nd ed. 1994).
303
Id.; see also, Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456, 460 (4th Cir. 1973)
(holding “[b]ut if a college has a student newspaper, its publication cannot be
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Most courts have suggested that to deem a college student
publication a non-public forum would be illogical.304 Based on a
heavy presumption in favor of protection for the college student
press, courts have upheld students’ rights to publish a wide variety
of potentially controversial material.305 A majority of courts insist
that unless school administrators are able to demonstrate that
publication of the material in question would satisfy Tinker’s
substantial disruption requirement, censorship of the expression is
prohibited by the First Amendment.306
Where the issue has been addressed, courts have uniformly—
until Hosty—declined to extend Hazelwood’s framework to college
student publications. To date, two Circuits have explicitly refused
to do so. In Student Government Association v. Board of Trustees
suppressed because college officials dislike its editorial content.”); Stanley v.
McGrath, 719 F.2d 279, 282 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding, “[a] public university may
not constitutionally take adverse action against a student newspaper, such as
withdrawing or reducing the paper’s funding, because it disapproves of the
content of the paper.”); Schiff v. Williams, 519 F.2d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 1975)
(noting that “the right of free speech embodied in the publication of a college
student newspaper cannot be controlled except under special circumstances.”).
304
Id.; see e.g., Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1336 (D. Mass.
1970) (holding “[t]he university setting of college-age students being exposed to
a wide range of intellectual experience creates a relatively mature marketplace
for the interchange of ideas, so the underlying assumption that there is a positive
social value in an open forum seems particularly appropriate.”); Bazaar v.
Fortune, 476 F.2d 570, 574 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding “[i]t seems a well
established rule that once a university recognizes a student activity that has
elements of free expression, it can act to censor that expression only if it acts
consistent with First Amendment constitutional guarantees.”).
305
For examples of such publications, see e.g., Thonen v. Jenkins, 491 F.2d
722 (4th Cir. 1973) (concerning a letter published in the student newspaper
ending with a “four-letter vulgarity” referring to the college president); Korn v.
Elkins, 317 F. Supp. 138 (D. Md. 1970) (allowing publication of a student
feature magazine featuring a burning American flag on the cover); Dickey v.
Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967) (permitting
student publication of criticisms of the Governor of the State of Alabama and
the State Legislature); Panarella v. Birenbaum, 32 N.Y.2d 108 (N.Y. 1973)
(allowing publication of several articles (that the court itself termed “derogatory,
profane, and blasphemous”) in a student-run college newspaper.).
306
See, e.g., Korn, 317 F. Supp. at 142; Mazart, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 118;
Antonelli, 308 F. Supp. at 1336.
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of the University of Massachusetts,307 the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit held that a university’s decision to close its student
legal services office did not violate the First Amendment, even if
the decision was prompted by lawsuits the office had filed against
the school on the students’ behalf.308 In doing so, the court
distinguished student newspapers, which operate as open or limited
public forums and are consequently granted broad First
Amendment protections, from the legal services office which did
not operate as a public forum.309 In a footnote, the court stated,
“Hazelwood . . . is not applicable to college newspapers.”310 More
recently, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed the
issue in Kincaid v. Gibson.311 Applying a public forum analysis,
the court determined that the Thorobread, the student yearbook at
Kentucky State University, should be classified as a limited public
forum.312 Because the yearbook did not fall into the non-public
forum category, the court determined that “Hazelwood [had] little
application to [the] case.”313
Ultimately, public forum analysis where college student
publications are concerned simply does not fit. To begin, in
determining that the Spectrum was a non-public forum, the
Supreme Court in Hazelwood emphasized the fact that the paper
was controlled by the school through financial assistance and
editorial oversight.314 Such is not the case with collegiate student
publications. The vast majority of newspapers at public colleges
and universities are largely or completely financially independent
of the school, and almost all exist apart from the school’s
curriculum and are editorially autonomous.315 Moreover, the
307

868 F.2d 473 (1st Cir. 1989).
Id. at 477.
309
Id. at 480 (“the [Legal Services Office] is not a channel of
communication and forum analysis is therefore inapplicable.”).
310
Id. at 480 n.6.
311
236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
312
Id. at 346 n.5.
313
Id.
314
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kulhmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262-63 (1988).
315
Brief Amici Curiae of the Student Press Law Center, in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellees Margaret Hosty, et. al., (No. 01-4155), reprinted in SPLC,
308
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Hazelwood Court stressed the fact that the high school newspaper
was part of the curriculum.316 Again, such is not typical of student
publications in a post-secondary setting. In fact, “a 1997 study
found that only one of the 101 daily college student newspapers
surveyed could be classified as strongly curriculum based.”317
Central to Hazelwood’s public forum analysis were several
factors. In Lueth v. St. Clair County Community College,318 a
federal district court considered these factors in determining
whether The Gazette, a student-run college newspaper, should be
considered a public forum. Comparing the operation of the student
paper at issue in Hazelwood and that of the Gazette, the court
found significant differences between the two:
First, the Gazette does not operate in a “laboratory
situation,” in that the Gazette is not operated under the
guise of a specific academic course, and exists under
formal school policy as a student administered activity and
not within the defendant community college’s “adopted
curriculum.” Second, the Gazette is not created under the
direction of a faculty member, but is instead operated
entirely by student participants, particularly the Editor-inChief. In fact, the Editor-in-Chief, per express terms of the
Rules and Regulations of the Gazette, fulfills most of the
Brief of the Student Press Law Center and 24 other media, First Amendment,
and journalism education organizations (visited Nov. 30, 2005), available at
http://www.splc.org/pdf/gsuamicus.pdf (hereinafter SPLC Hosty Brief) (citing
Lillian Lodge Kopenhaver, CAMPUS MEDIA OPERATIONS, College Media
Review (Winter 2002), at 6. (noting that a 2001 survey found that more than
70% of newspapers at public four-year institutions received more than half of
their funding and revenue from advertising. The study also found that almost
one-fifth of all college student newspapers generate 90% or more of their own
funds through advertising.)); see also Tenhoff, supra note 287, at 514 (noting
that the vast majority of a university newspaper’s funding comes from its own
advertising and citing the fact that, in some instances, newspapers only receive
university funding when their advertising income is insufficient).
316
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 268.
317
SPLC Hosty Brief, supra note 315 (citing John Bodle, The Instructional
Independence of Daily Student Newspapers, JOURNALISM & MASS COMM.
EDUCATOR, Winter 1997, at 16).
318
732 F. Supp. 1410 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
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obligations attributed to the [Hazelwood] teacher. Finally,
the Gazette is freely distributed throughout the local
community, and seeks outside advertisers to aid in the
funding of the paper’s publication.319
Given these differences, the unique nature of college student media
should not be subject to a strict and unyielding public forum
analysis. Rather, as the Supreme Court has indicated,320 courts
presented with First Amendment free speech and press challenges
should engage in a careful review of the nature and context of the
student speech in question.
Despite its inappropriateness and impropriety, application of a
public forum analysis in Hosty reveals the INNOVATOR as a
designated or limited public forum. Though the Seventh Circuit
ultimately reached this conclusion, it did so grudgingly.321 The
INNOVATOR was financially independent, funded entirely from
the Student Activities Fees.322 Moreover, although there was a
faculty advisor in place, the students were editorially
autonomous—charged with determining the format and content of
the paper—and were not, according to school policy, subject to

319

Id. at 1414-15.
See, e.g., Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, 523
U.S. 666, 672-73 (1998) (holding that “the public forum doctrine should not be
extended in a mechanical way to the very different context of public television
broadcasting.”); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense Fund and Educational
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985) (stating that the Court will not ignore the
special nature and function of the federal workplace in evaluating the limits that
may be imposed on an organization’s right to participate in a fundraising
forum.); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44
(1983) (holding that “[t]he existence of a right of access to public property and
the standard by which limitations upon such a right must be evaluated differ
depending on the character of the property at issue.”).
321
Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 737 (7th Cir. 2005). Easterbrook, writing
for the majority, noted, “[w]e do not think it possible on this record to determine
what kind of forum the University established . . . [But the question is] whether
the evidence makes out a constitutional claim when taken in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. Accordingly, the majority conceded that the
record would permit a reasonable fact finder to conclude that INNOVATOR
operated in a public forum.
322
Id. at 738.
320
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prior review.323 The INNOVATOR, operating as a limited public
forum, was beyond the purview of the University, and Dean
Carter’s demand for prior review and approval amounted to a
violation of the students’ First Amendment rights.
D. Potential Chilling—The Practical Effect of Hosty
By questioning the traditional presumption of independence of
college student media, the Hosty court introduced a dangerous
ambiguity to the rights of all students engaged in any form of
expression. As Mark Goodman, executive director of the Student
Press Law Center noted, “Traditionally, student newspapers were
presumed by their very nature to be forums for free expression . . .
[Hosty] gives schools the chance to argue that’s not what they
intended.”324 Goodman went on to suggest that determining forum
status for other school-funded student activities, such as speakers
and films, might be even more difficult since those forms of
expression do not enjoy the traditional presumption of operating as
a public forum.325 For example, in November 2004, Indian River
Community College (FL) refused to allow the film The Passion of
the Christ on campus. The College claimed an unwritten blanket
ban on R-rated movies, despite the fact that at around the same
time, the school had allowed theatrical productions that would
have garnered an R rating and had sponsored at least one other Rrated film.326
Writing for the majority in Hosty, Judge Easterbrook noted,
“Let us not forget that academic freedom includes the authority of
the university to manage an academic community and evaluate
teaching and scholarship free from interference.”327 Clearly
suggesting that determining the content of a school-funded
newspaper might be a proper exercise of the university’s academic
323

Id. at 737-38.
Student Media Experts React to Governors State University Ruling,
supra note 163.
325
Id.
326
More information about this case is available on FIRE’s website at
http://www.thefire.org/index.php/case/661.html.
327
Hosty, 412 F.3d at 736.
324
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freedom, the Hosty majority ignored the possibility that an
extension of Hazelwood’s framework to the post-secondary level
might also chill faculty members’ exercise of First Amendment
rights. Hazelwood has been interpreted by numerous lower courts
to apply to both student and teacher speech.328 Courts have granted
high school administrators broad329 and, in at least one case,
apparently unlimited330 authority to dictate curriculum and
presentation of material in the classroom. At least one court,
recognizing the potentially devastating implications of extending
Hazelwood to faculty speech, explicitly refused to reach the

328

See, e.g., Richard J. Peltz, Censorship Tsunami Spares College Media:
To Protect Free Expression on Public Campuses, Lessons From the “College
Hazelwood” Case, 68 TENN. L. REV. 481, 483 (2001) (reasoning that
“Hazelwood has served as a springboard for lower courts to allow executive
inroads not only into other student constitutional freedoms, but also into the
sacrosanct realm of teachers’ academic freedom.”).
329
See, e.g., Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004 (7th
Cir. 1990) (rejecting a high school teacher’s claim that he should be permitted to
teach a non-evolutionary theory in his social studies class.); Ward v. Hickey,
996 F.2d 448, 453 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding “[l]ike the newspaper, a teacher’s
classroom speech is part of the curriculum. Indeed, a teacher’s principal
classroom role is to teach students the school curriculum. Thus, schools may
reasonably limit teachers’ speech in that setting.”); Kirkland v. Northside Indep.
Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 800 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Although the concept of
academic freedom has been recognized in our jurisprudence, the doctrine has
never conferred upon teachers the control of public school curricula.”); Miles v.
Denver Public Schools, 944 F.2d 773, 779 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding “case law
does not support [a] position that a secondary school teacher has a constitutional
right to academic freedom.”); Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Ed., 42 F.3d 719, 722 (2nd Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1160 (1995)
(explaining that school officials are in the best position to ensure that their
students “learn whatever lessons [an] activity is designed to teach, [and] that
readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for
their level of maturity.”) (internal citations omitted).
330
Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Ed., 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998)
(en banc). Here, the court rejected a high school drama teacher’s claim that her
transfer to junior high was in retaliation for her selection of a controversial play.
In dicta the court found that regulation of the curriculum is, by definition, a
legitimate pedagogical concern, and that the teacher had no First Amendment
right to control its makeup. Id. at 370.
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issue.331 Such an expansion of Hazelwood’s restrictive framework
would effectively defeat the notion of the university as a
“quintessential marketplace of ideas” and provide public school
administrators with unprecedented authority to control faulty
speech.
Finally, endorsement of Hazelwood beyond the high school
setting will have a potentially destructive effect on the recruitment
and training of future professional journalists. Research
demonstrates that early participation on student newspapers is
profoundly influential on student journalists’ attitudes toward the
press.332 Not only is an uncensored college newspaper vital to
attracting new journalism students, it provides those students with
real-world training. Both large and small newspapers look highly
favorably upon prior journalism experience and well-honed writing
skills when hiring new reporters.333 Moreover, apart from writing
and reporting skills, by working for a college newspaper, aspiring
journalists learn to accept responsibility for what they publish. For
this reason, it is argued that “the student publication offers the
single best avenue for training—superior even to the journalism
school . . . for a career in professional journalism.”334 Extending
Hazelwood to allow administrative control over these publications
would defeat these goals. As Professor Peltz observed, “Imagine a
generation of college-trained journalists with no practical
experience handling controversial subject matter, nor with any
more than an academic understanding of the role of the Fourth

331

Vanderhurst v. Colorado Mountain College Dist., 208 F.3d 908 (10th
Cir. 2000) (holding “we need not decide definitively, however, whether that
framework does in fact govern a public college or university’s control over the
classroom speech of a professor or other instructor.”).
332
See generally, Michael McDevitt et al., The Making and Unmaking of
Civic Journalists: Influences of Professional Socialization, 79 JOURNALISM &
MASS COMMC’N Q. 87 (2002); Jennifer Rauch, et al., Clinging to Tradition,
Welcoming Civic Solutions: A Survey of College Students’ Attitude Toward
Civic Journalism, 58 JOURNALISM & MASS COMMC’N EDUCATOR 175 (2003).
333
Barbara J. Hipsman & Stanley T. Wearden, SKILLS TESTING AT
AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS, at 11-14 (Aug. 1989) (paper presented for Education
in Journalism and Mass Communication, Newspaper Division).
334
Peltz, supra note 328, at 482.
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Estate in American society.”335
CONCLUSION
On February 21, 2006, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
the matter of Hosty v. Carter, allowing the Seventh Circuit’s ruling
to stand. There is, on one hand, an argument to be made for
upholding the decision. In Hazelwood’s infamous footnote seven,
the Supreme Court acknowledged the possibility of extending its
holding to post-secondary education: “We need not now decide
whether the same degree of deference is appropriate with respect to
school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and university
level.”336 If the Court had meant to confine Hazelwood to the high
school setting, the note would be superfluous. Instead, its presence
suggests that future courts, acting in much the same way as the
Seventh Circuit, might be justified in extending the ruling to
college student speech.
There are, however, stronger arguments in favor of limiting
Hazelwood to the high school setting. Critical comparison of Hosty
and Hazelwood reveals that the biggest similarity between the two
is that they both involved a student newspaper. The similarities end
there. As discussed in Part III, the differences between primary and
secondary school students and their college counterparts are both
numerous and profound. In order to justify its decision in Hosty
and apply Hazelwood to speech on college campuses, the Seventh
Circuit effectively had to overrule more than thirty years of First
Amendment jurisprudence. First, the Seventh Circuit failed to
address adequately the fundamental differences that exist between
high school and college students. Further, the court cannot
reconcile the profoundly different approaches that have been taken
toward free speech in primary and secondary schools as compared
to undergraduate and graduate institutions. Finally, any court
wishing to extend Hazelwood would have to consider the
inevitable chilling effect, not only on student journalists, but on all
speech on the nation’s university campuses. Allowing
335
336

Id.
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 n.7 (1988).
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Hazelwood’s restrictive framework inside the college gates is to
substantially disrupt the well-established ideal of the university as
the “quintessential marketplace of ideas.”

